

U.S. Department of Justice

Washington, DC 20530

Supplemental Statement**Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended**For Six Month Period Ending 31 July 2020

(Insert date)

I - REGISTRANT

1. (a) Name of Registrant (b) Registration No.
- Nathan Shepura 6630
- (c) Business Address(es) of Registrant
- European People's Party (EPP)

2. Has there been a change in the information previously furnished in connection with the following?

(a) If an individual:

- | | | |
|---------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| (1) Residence address(es) | Yes <input type="checkbox"/> | No <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (2) Citizenship | Yes <input type="checkbox"/> | No <input type="checkbox"/> |
| (3) Occupation | Yes <input type="checkbox"/> | No <input type="checkbox"/> |

(b) If an organization:

- | | | |
|--------------------------|------------------------------|--|
| (1) Name | Yes <input type="checkbox"/> | No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| (2) Ownership or control | Yes <input type="checkbox"/> | No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |
| (3) Branch offices | Yes <input type="checkbox"/> | No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> |

(c) Explain fully all changes, if any, indicated in Items (a) and (b) above.

IF THE REGISTRANT IS AN INDIVIDUAL, OMIT RESPONSE TO ITEMS 3, 4, AND 5(a).3. If you have previously filed Exhibit C¹, state whether any changes therein have occurred during this 6 month reporting period.Yes ☐ No ☒If yes, have you filed an amendment to the Exhibit C? Yes ☐ No ☐

If no, please attach the required amendment.

¹ The Exhibit C, for which no printed form is provided, consists of a true copy of the charter, articles of incorporation, association, and by laws of a registrant that is an organization. (A waiver of the requirement to file an Exhibit C may be obtained for good cause upon written application to the Assistant Attorney General, National Security Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC 20530.)

4. (a) Have any persons ceased acting as partners, officers, directors or similar officials of the registrant during this 6 month reporting period?

Yes ☐ No ☒

If yes, furnish the following information:

Name	Position	Date Connection Ended
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(b) Have any persons become partners, officers, directors or similar officials during this 6 month reporting period?

Yes ☐ No ☒

If yes, furnish the following information:

Name	Residence Address	Citizenship	Position	Date Assumed
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5. (a) Has any person named in Item 4(b) rendered services directly in furtherance of the interests of any foreign principal?

Yes ☐ No ☐

If yes, identify each such person and describe the service rendered.

(b) During this six month reporting period, has the registrant hired as employees or in any other capacity, any persons who rendered or will render services to the registrant directly in furtherance of the interests of any foreign principal(s) in other than a clerical or secretarial, or in a related or similar capacity? Yes ☐ No ☒

Name	Residence Address	Citizenship	Position	Date Assumed
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(c) Have any employees or individuals, who have filed a short form registration statement, terminated their employment or connection with the registrant during this 6 month reporting period? Yes ☐ No ☒

If yes, furnish the following information:

Name	Position or Connection	Date Terminated
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(d) Have any employees or individuals, who have filed a short form registration statement, terminated their connection with any foreign principal during this 6 month reporting period? Yes ☐ No ☒

If yes, furnish the following information:

Name	Position or Connection	Foreign Principal	Date Terminated
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6. Have short form registration statements been filed by all of the persons named in Items 5(a) and 5(b) of the supplemental statement?

Yes ☒ No ☐

If no, list names of persons who have not filed the required statement.

II - FOREIGN PRINCIPAL

-
7. Has your connection with any foreign principal ended during this 6 month reporting period? Yes ☐ No ☒
If yes, furnish the following information:

Foreign Principal

Date of Termination

-
8. Have you acquired any new foreign principal(s)² during this 6 month reporting period? Yes ☐ No ☒
If yes, furnish the following information:

Name and Address of Foreign Principal(s)

Date Acquired

-
9. In addition to those named in Items 7 and 8, if any, list foreign principal(s)² whom you continued to represent during the 6 month reporting period.

European People's Party (EPP)

-
10. (a) Have you filed exhibits for the newly acquired foreign principal(s), if any, listed in Item 8?

Exhibit A³ Yes ☐ No ☒Exhibit B⁴ Yes ☐ No ☒

If no, please attach the required exhibit.

- (b) Have there been any changes in the Exhibits A and B previously filed for any foreign principal whom you represented during this six month period? Yes ☐ No ☒

If yes, have you filed an amendment to these exhibits? Yes ☐ No ☒

If no, please attach the required amendment.

² The term "foreign principal" includes, in addition to those defined in Section 1(b) of the Act, an individual organization any of whose activities are directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized in whole or in major part by a foreign government, foreign political party, foreign organization or foreign individual. (See Rule 100(a) (9)). A registrant who represents more than one foreign principal is required to list in the statements he files under the Act only those principals for whom he is not entitled to claim exemption under Section 3 of the Act. (See Rule 208.)

³ The Exhibit A, which is filed on Form NSD-3, sets forth the information required to be disclosed concerning each foreign principal.

⁴ The Exhibit B, which is filed on Form NSD-4, sets forth the information concerning the agreement or understanding between the registrant and the foreign principal.

III - ACTIVITIES

11. During this 6 month reporting period, have you engaged in any activities for or rendered any services to any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement? Yes ☒ No ☐

If yes, identify each foreign principal and describe in full detail your activities and services:

I've worked as a Political Adviser for the EPP per my full-time employment contract. This has involved contributions to an op/ed by the EPP SG on transatlantic relations, a statement by the EPP Presidency on the situation in Hong Kong and a position paper on EU-China relations adopted by the EPP Political Assembly (see attachments). I also coordinated the participation of US Amb. to NATO Hutchison in a February 4th panel (see attachment). I attended a February 19th dinner event in Brussels featuring a keynote speech by a Joe Biden adviser (see attachment) and an online June 4th event — the first of the WMCES [Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies]/Congressional Institute Series — featuring Rep. Mike Gallagher and the EPP SG (see attachment). I hosted several dozen online interviews of EPP leaders (link below) and participated as an EPP podcast guest on EU-UK relations (link below) and on July 8th as an online speaker on EU trade to AmCham EU's Transatlantic Task Force.
<https://open.spotify.com/episode/26ebVPxWgFl3YjKEQfOlnL>

12. During this 6 month reporting period, have you on behalf of any foreign principal engaged in political activity⁵ as defined below? Yes ☐ No ☒

If yes, identify each such foreign principal and describe in full detail all such political activity, indicating, among other things, the relations, interests and policies sought to be influenced and the means employed to achieve this purpose. If the registrant arranged, sponsored or delivered speeches, lectures or radio and TV broadcasts, give details as to dates, places of delivery, names of speakers and subject matter.

13. In addition to the above described activities, if any, have you engaged in activity on your own behalf which benefits your foreign principal(s)? Yes ☐ No ☒

If yes, describe fully.

⁵ "Political activity," as defined in Section 1(o) of the Act, means any activity that the person engaging in believes will, or that the person intends to, in any way influence any agency or official of the Government of the United States or any section of the public within the United States with reference to formulating, adopting or changing the domestic or foreign policies of the United States or with reference to political or public interests, policies, or relations of a government of a foreign country or a foreign political party.

IV - FINANCIAL INFORMATION**14. (a) RECEIPTS-MONIES**

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal, any contributions, income or money either as compensation or otherwise? Yes ☒ No ☐

If no, explain why.

If yes, set forth below in the required detail and separately for each foreign principal an account of such monies.⁶

Date	From Whom	Purpose	Amount
		From February 1st to July 31st of 2020, I received a gross income of 50,460.66 euros, per full-time employment contract with the EPP.	0
			Total

(b) RECEIPTS - FUNDRAISING CAMPAIGN

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received, as part of a fundraising campaign⁷, any money on behalf of any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement? Yes ☐ No ☒

If yes, have you filed an Exhibit D⁸ to your registration? Yes ☐ No ☒

If yes, indicate the date the Exhibit D was filed. Date _____

(c) RECEIPTS-THINGS OF VALUE

During this 6 month reporting period, have you received any thing of value⁹ other than money from any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement, or from any other source, for or in the interests of any such foreign principal?

Yes ☐ No ☒

If yes, furnish the following information:

Foreign Principal	Date Received	Thing of Value	Purpose
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^{6, 7} A registrant is required to file an Exhibit D if he collects or receives contributions, loans, moneys, or other things of value for a foreign principal, as part of a fundraising campaign. (See Rule 201(e)).

⁸ An Exhibit D, for which no printed form is provided, sets forth an account of money collected or received as a result of a fundraising campaign and transmitted for a foreign principal.

⁹ Things of value include but are not limited to gifts, interest free loans, expense free travel, favored stock purchases, exclusive rights, favored treatment over competitors, "kickbacks," and the like.

15. (a) DISBURSEMENTS-MONIES

During this 6 month reporting period, have you

- (1) disbursed or expended monies in connection with activity on behalf of any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement? Yes ☐ No ☒
- (2) transmitted monies to any such foreign principal? Yes ☐ No ☒

If no, explain in full detail why there were no disbursements made on behalf of any foreign principal.

If yes, set forth below in the required detail and separately for each foreign principal an account of such monies, including monies transmitted, if any, to each foreign principal.

Date	To Whom	Purpose	Amount
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Total

(b) DISBURSEMENTS-THINGS OF VALUE

During this 6 month reporting period, have you disposed of anything of value¹⁰ other than money in furtherance of or in connection with activities on behalf of any foreign principal named in Items 7, 8, or 9 of this statement?

Yes ☐No ☒

If yes, furnish the following information:

Date	Recipient	Foreign Principal	Thing of Value	Purpose
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(c) DISBURSEMENTS-POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

During this 6 month reporting period, have you from your own funds and on your own behalf either directly or through any other person, made any contributions of money or other things of value¹¹ in connection with an election to any political office, or in connection with any primary election, convention, or caucus held to select candidates for political office?

Yes ☐No ☒

If yes, furnish the following information:

Date	Amount or Thing of Value	Political Organization or Candidate	Location of Event
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10, 11 Things of value include but are not limited to gifts, interest free loans, expense free travel, favored stock purchases, exclusive rights, favored treatment over competitors, "kickbacks," and the like.

V - INFORMATIONAL MATERIALS

16. (a) During this 6 month reporting period, did you prepare, disseminate or cause to be disseminated any informational materials?¹²

Yes ☐ No ☒

If Yes, go to Item 17.

(b) If you answered No to Item 16(a), do you disseminate any material in connection with your registration?

Yes ☐ No ☐

If Yes, please forward the materials disseminated during the six month period to the Registration Unit for review.

17. Identify each such foreign principal.

No informational materials were disseminated in the United States or targeted to a U.S. audience.

18. During this 6 month reporting period, has any foreign principal established a budget or allocated a specified sum of money to finance your activities in preparing or disseminating informational materials? Yes ☐ No ☒

If yes, identify each such foreign principal, specify amount, and indicate for what period of time.

19. During this 6 month reporting period, did your activities in preparing, disseminating or causing the dissemination of informational materials include the use of any of the following:

- ☐ Radio or TV broadcasts ☐ Magazine or newspaper ☐ Motion picture films ☐ Letters or telegrams
☐ Advertising campaigns ☐ Press releases ☐ Pamphlets or other publications ☐ Lectures or speeches
☐ Other (*specify*) _____

Electronic Communications

- ☐ Email
☐ Website URL(s): _____
☐ Social media websites URL(s): _____
☐ Other (*specify*) _____

20. During this 6 month reporting period, did you disseminate or cause to be disseminated informational materials among any of the following groups:

- ☐ Public officials ☐ Newspapers ☐ Libraries
☐ Legislators ☐ Editors ☐ Educational institutions
☐ Government agencies ☐ Civic groups or associations ☐ Nationality groups
☐ Other (*specify*) _____

21. What language was used in the informational materials:

- ☐ English ☐ Other (*specify*) _____

22. Did you file with the Registration Unit, U.S. Department of Justice a copy of each item of such informational materials disseminated or caused to be disseminated during this 6 month reporting period? Yes ☐ No ☐

23. Did you label each item of such informational materials with the statement required by Section 4(b) of the Act?

Yes ☐ No ☐

¹² The term informational materials includes any oral, visual, graphic, written, or pictorial information or matter of any kind, including that published by means of advertising, books, periodicals, newspapers, lectures, broadcasts, motion pictures, or any means or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce or otherwise. Informational materials disseminated by an agent of a foreign principal as part of an activity in itself exempt from registration, or an activity which by itself would not require registration, need not be filed pursuant to Section 4(b) of the Act.

EXECUTION

In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746, and subject to the penalties of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 and 22 U.S.C. § 618, the undersigned swears or affirms under penalty of perjury that he/she has read the information set forth in this statement filed pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 611 *et seq.*, that he/she is familiar with the contents thereof, and that such contents are in their entirety true and accurate to the best of his/her knowledge and belief.


Date


Printed Name

Signature

Sept 29, 2020

Nathan Shepura





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Europe Should Untap the Full Potential of the Transatlantic Relationship

By **Antonio López-Istúriz White** - February 18, 2020

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Transatlantic relations have seen better days. It has sometimes been too easy for us Europeans to complain about the Trump administration. But when friends fight, typically both are to blame. Rather than pointing fingers, Europe should seize the opportunity to address current imbalances in transatlantic relations and untapped the full potential of this partnership.

Concerning trade, Europe is of course already a force to be reckoned with. The EU has the largest internal market in the world and a single, unified trade policy. Because of our success at home in eliminating internal tariffs and quotas, we have become a true believer in free and fair, rules-based trade across the world. In recent years, we have stood proudly at the forefront in setting high new global standards.

Our first preference has always been a new multilateral trade regime under the World Trade Organization. Yet with negotiations long stalled — and the urgency of this situation is only highlighted by the paralysis starting in December 2019 of the Appellate Body for resolving disputes — the European Union has not shied away from pursuing ambitious new trade agreements. Since negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) stopped in 2016, the EU has launched talks with Australia and New Zealand, updated our agreement with Mexico and concluded deals with Canada and Japan and Singapore. Major progress has also been made vis-à-vis Vietnam and Mercosur. While we regret the UK's decision to leave the EU, we look forward now to negotiating a close future partnership with our British friends. The European Union — grounded all the while in basic values like a commitment to defending human rights and to fighting climate change — remains open for business.

This openness includes a renewed desire for closer trade ties, on the other side of the Atlantic, with our American friends — a desire signalled by the agreement signed in July 2018 by Presidents Juncker and Trump as well as by the renewed European Commission mandate given by member states in April 2019. Let's not forget, after all, EU-US trade accounts for full one third of

global GDP and supports 16 million jobs, including 4.6 million for Americans hired by European companies in the US. 54% of foreign investment into the US comes from Europe, including \$43.8 billion in R&D. While it is true that the EU maintains a surplus in exchange of goods with the United States, trade in services is nearly equal. And whatever we might hear sometimes about high tariffs — and the US, for instance, imposed new tariffs on several member states this past October after the WTO's Airbus ruling; and new US tariffs are a possibility following a growing push in Europe for fair digital taxation — let's also not forget that transatlantic tariffs remain on average less than 3%.

What we should be focusing on, on both sides of the Atlantic, is not the real yet relatively minor disagreements between us, but rather the geopolitical partnership which is only becoming more and more essential. We are very aware of the challenges we face in common, including global terrorism, the threat posed by Iran, and an aggressive Russia which has meddled in elections both in Europe and in the US. Perhaps most of all, a rising China, and a more ambitious China, will require a common and creative new commitment to multilateral institutions which the US and Europe have for decades shaped together and which have on the whole proved invaluable.

One way the European Union must step up is in defence. Simply put, we in Europe have been living comfortably under the American security umbrella for seven decades. Many Europeans are not aware enough, are not grateful enough, for this. This situation needs to change. Becoming a stronger security partner must start with EU member states. Most EU members are also members of NATO, which remains and must remain our primary collective defence infrastructure. In London this past December, all NATO members re-committed themselves to move towards the 2% target. It is vital that in Europe we stick to this commitment. This means, in many cases, significantly accelerating our defence spending — not just in absolute terms, as our economies continue to grow, but in relative terms as well. In some countries, this of course is not politically easy. But it must be done; we need to do much more.

The EU has presented an important framework which can help member states towards this goal. Through Permanent Structured Cooperation, or PESCO, formalized in December 2017, 25 EU member states have agreed to work jointly on various defence projects, thereby getting more bang for their buck. The European Defence Agency helps to advise member states on these projects, ensuring money is not wasted. A critical further step Europe can take will be agreeing on the Multiannual Financial Framework for the 2021-2027 cycle. For the first time, the EU budget will have a specific chapter dedicated to security and defence, with a large part of this budget going to the European Defence Fund, making the EU one of the top four R&D investors in defence in Europe.

President Trump has long pointed out how important it is that European countries bear their fair share of the burden when it comes to common defence. We agree. Europe has taken and must continue to take important steps towards becoming a stronger and more equal security and defence partner to the United States.

Finally, a word about common values. The EU and the US share a fundamental commitment to rule of law and democracy and to basic freedoms and human rights. We can easily take this for granted. And yet one does not have to venture far beyond our borders to appreciate anew the meaning of these principles. We have been entrusted with freedom; it is ours, as citizens and as leaders, to preserve and strengthen. And the world around us is challenging us: in the form of political or cybersecurity threats to our media landscapes, and in a growing authoritarianism in many places.

We in the EPP will always defend democracy and freedom against those who would destroy them. We are glad the EU is pursuing greater tools to help us in this, for instance in the form of sanctions against individual officials found to have committed blatant human rights violations: the EU equivalent, essentially, to America's 'Magnitsky Act'. I and the EPP have long called for such sanctions, for example, against cronies of the brutal dictator Nicolás Maduro. The EU last September added several individuals to its target list, and in November it renewed for another

year the restrictive measures against this group and against the Maduro government's ability to continue to repress the Venezuelan people.

This is yet one more area where the EU and the US can make common cause, not only with regards to Venezuela but more generally where basic human freedom and democracy are at stake: to send common messages to our friends as well as adversaries and to help in achieving common desired outcomes in the world. This is yet one more way Europe can play a greater role. And one more way Europe can become a more equal American partner.

The European People's Party, the largest force and the strongest centre-right force in European politics, is as committed as ever to deepening our transatlantic ties. As we have seen, they are more vital and more enduring than any tweet.

Antonio López-Istúriz White

+ posts

Secretary General of the European People's Party – Spanish member of the European Parliament with the EPP Group





EPP Presidency Statement

Chinese Disinformation and the Situation in Hong Kong

11 June 2020

01

EPP Presidency Statement

The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed several crucial issues for the European Union, among them the vulnerability of vital supply chains, especially those sourced in China. Equally important and increasingly apparent is the extent to which China's economic as well as political leverage, including vis-à-vis the EU, has grown. These issues raise important questions.

As the European Commission clarified in Spring 2019, China is simultaneously a cooperation and negotiating partner, an economic competitor and a systemic rival to the European Union. The EU has a major role to play in setting the values and standards of the 21st-century world — now a world struggling to overcome a public health as well as an economic crisis. Guided by our values — above all the rights and freedoms inherent to democracy — we must act with strategic vision, boldness and unity in putting forward a uniquely European model of global cooperation.

In recent months, we have become increasingly aware and particularly concerned by the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) aggressive effort to spread propaganda and to pressure critics, including even by censoring EU political messages. The CCP has pushed disinformation aimed to deflect legitimate criticism of its handling of the pandemic, and to undermine Western political values.

Therefore, together with our stakeholders, the EPP commits to intensifying our efforts to coordinate our political family in countering the ongoing threats to our democratic principles. We cannot thwart or refute every attack of fake news; but this reinforced coordination will help in developing more effective strategies and implementing more effective action plans: to strengthen democracy and our European project.

Equally alarming is the CCP's renewed and intensified attempt to bring Hong Kong under more direct central control. Following mass protests last summer and autumn — garnering broad international support and resulting ultimately in Beijing's withdrawal of an infamous extradition law — the Hong Kong police in April arrested a number of democratic activists and the CCP in late May 2020 bypassed Hong Kong's legislature and unilaterally introduced a pending national security law threatening to end free expression and undermine the democratic representation protected under the Joint Declaration and the Hong Kong Basic Law. This jeopardises the very existence of Hong Kong's rule-of-law framework and calls into question the legitimacy of its autonomous status as per the agreed 'One Country, Two Systems' principle.

As we stated strongly in our October 2019 ['Resolution in response to the ongoing protests in Hong Kong'](#), the EPP is committed to basic values of human dignity and human rights, freedom and responsibility, democracy, solidarity, justice and the rule of law. We join with the European Union, with the EPP Group in the European Parliament, with the International Democrat Union, with the governments of the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and the United States and with others in expressing deep concern over the current situation. We condemn the CCP's suppression of guaranteed freedoms in Hong Kong, in violation of its own stated international agreements and contrary to the spirit of commitments made to citizens. We reiterate our strong EPP support for the 'One Country, Two Systems' principle and for all the rights therein enshrined for the citizens of Hong Kong in accordance with the Basic Law.



**If you have any question
you would like to ask please
contact us.**

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EPP Position Paper: EU-China Relations in a COVID-19 World and Beyond

adopted by the EPP Political Assembly

28 September 2020



01 EPP Position Paper

Introduction

The coronavirus pandemic, exacting a toll in the European Union of over **140 000 lives** and a **projected economic** contraction of 8.3%, has revealed new vulnerabilities. Crucial discussions, requiring difficult decisions, remain as to how best to overcome the public health as well as economic crisis and their social impact. Ultimately, as with others in the past, this crisis reveals the reality of Member States', and the EU's, increasing limits of interdependency and the need for more effective multilateral cooperation. The EU, in particular, has a vital opportunity to act with clarity and competence on behalf of EU Member States, internally and internationally: to be a strong and viable partner for Western Balkan and Neighbourhood countries and a leader at global level in consistently promoting European interests and values.

The pandemic has clarified the growing importance of the EU's relationship with China. While the European Union and the West more broadly have for decades believed that not only modernisation but liberalisation would follow China's greater globalisation, China has instead become a geopolitical challenge for Western democracies. The time has come to redefine our approach and relationship with China and to recognise the challenge China poses; to ensure consistency in the EU's value-based foreign policy; and to strengthen cooperation with our democratic allies in defence of democracy, our core values and the international world order.

Like any country, China has the right to pursue its interest and achieve its potential, including by becoming a global leader. The responsibility of global leadership, however, requires respect for universal human rights and for the rule of law. The trajectory China takes — towards greater authoritarianism and aggression, or towards the values of democracy, transparency, rule of law and human rights — will have a decisive global impact.

EU-China Relations Framework

It is therefore fitting that no external relationship for the EU has come more into focus than that with China. Even before the current crisis, 2020 looked to be pivotal, with a regular EU-China Summit (held by video-conference on 22 June), a special EU Council-China Summit planned by the Germany Presidency (postponed indefinitely) and a hoped-for conclusion to the long negotiations on the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment. As the **European Parliament**, **European Commission** and **European Council** have all noted in recent years in official statements, a strategic partnership with China has developed over the course of decades, shaped since 2003 by the **Comprehensive Strategic Partnership**. As Lord Patten noted, 'There is no "golden age" in our relations with the Chinese Communist Party. We must work with China even while it suffers under a Communist dictatorship. But we should do so with our eyes wide open and while stripping away the mendacity and the cant.'

More specifically, the European Commission in Spring 2019 outlined four main categories for defining China as an interlocutor: 1) cooperation partner (e.g. on climate action); 2) negotiating partner (e.g. on investment and issues of connectivity); 3) economic competitor (e.g. in new technologies); and 4) systemic rival (in terms of fundamental values, most notably in the area of human rights). This final, new category — 'systemic rival' — has understandably garnered significant attention. At the same time, the European Union has consistently rejected as counterproductive and detrimental to EU interests a new regionalisation of the world into great-power politics. The EU continues to pursue, rather, a holistic international system built on cooperation, open trade and societal and corporate values, including foremost human rights.



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These four categories are dynamic, expanding or contracting as new factors arise. These often contradictory categories have complicated attempts to formulate a consistent agenda for EU-China relations. So, too, has the familiar difficulty of forging consensus among Member States, each with its own unique interests and relationship to China.

China has made major progress towards eliminating dire poverty. In recent years, China has reiterated a commitment to multilateral cooperation: including, for example, via United Nations peacekeeping operations. After decades of strategic planning, the country is now recognised as a leading great power not only economically but militarily, with a corresponding increase in political influence both regionally and beyond. In his report at the 19th Communist Party Congress in 2017, Chinese President Xi Jinping openly vowed that by 2049 China would 'become a global leader in terms of composite national strength and international influence.' A critical analysis of China's goals, actions and policies is therefore crucial for the EU — especially for a more geopolitical EU — and for the future of the rules-based liberal world order.

The COVID-19 Space

The coronavirus pandemic has brought into stark relief several vital issues for the European Union: the interdependency of public health measures; the limits of globalisation; the EU's disproportionate reliance on foreign suppliers, particularly in China, for medicines, protective equipment and other essential goods; and China's growing economic and political leverage.

The June 2020 EPP Presidency proposal '**Calling for EU Health Sovereignty**' addresses the fundamental structural challenges to ensuring greater strategic autonomy in EU health policy. The Commission's upcoming Pharmaceutical Strategy and the announced EU4Health Programme will be vital next steps, among others. It will also be imperative that the EU strengthen its relevant agencies as well as its voice in global institutions; and that the EU continue to address the pandemic's global consequences, particularly in Africa and the EU neighbourhood.

Within this broader context, several facts or incidents arising during the coronavirus crisis stand out as uniquely relevant to EU-China relations:

First, we acknowledge and welcome the mutual aid given, first by the EU and then by China, to help fight the worst shortages of the pandemic. As President von der Leyen **stated** in March 2020: 'We need each other's support in times of need.' Equally, we also acknowledge multiple allegations that some of the aid delivered by China was faulty or that its true nature was not transparently communicated. European aid to China was not sufficiently acknowledged.

Second, we welcome China's ongoing participation in multilateral fora — including China's participation in the European Union's 4 May 2020 **Coronavirus Global Response International Pledging Event** — and China's recent promised contributions to global efforts to develop a vaccine. We reiterate our commitment to multilateral cooperation where feasible: only by working together, including in partnership and dialogue with China, can the European Union and the world overcome fundamental challenges such as dire poverty, climate change and deadly pandemics. We therefore wholeheartedly welcome the 19 May 2020 World Health Assembly **resolution** — led by the EU and its Member States and garnering more than 130 co-sponsors, including China — calling for a full and transparent investigation into the origins of the coronavirus crisis. We nevertheless regret the lack of agreement on the inclusion of Taiwan in the World Health



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Organisation's Political Assembly, especially considering Taiwan's impressive response to addressing the pandemic.

Regrettably, we also recognise and condemn an ongoing lack of media freedom within China as relates to the current crisis. Whatever other causes there may have been for the initial spawn and global spread of COVID-19, the suppression of information and early whistle-blowers like the late Dr Li Wenliang within China itself played a key and harmful role and led to further loss of innocent lives; and invaluable time was lost. We are also concerned by reports of inaccurate or incomplete data provided by the Chinese government. As Cardinal Bo noted, it is the Chinese Communist Party's repression, lies and corruption that are responsible for this global crisis.

More than this, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has aimed to control the global narrative on COVID-19, including through **targeted influence operations and disinformation campaigns**, and has tried to deflect criticism of its own handling of the crisis, to sow confusion in European Member States and to erode citizens' trust in national as well as European institutions.

Chinese attempts to apply pressure by censoring analyses of EEAS EAST StratCom Unit and EU political declarations — as, for example, with regard to the 6 May 2020 **letter** published jointly by the EU ambassador to China and the ambassadors to China of all 27 Member States — must not be tolerated and must be a clear warning signal to strengthen European awareness and firmness at all levels vis-à-vis such practice.

These several cases in point have put front-and-centre both the reality of growing Chinese attempts to control the information space as well as the new reality of China's growing economic and political influence, including vis-à-vis the EU. In raising new questions — e.g. how did the virus originate? what early measures were or were not taken? how do current supply chains affect emergency preparedness? — the pandemic has revealed even more fundamental dynamics long at work.

It must also be acknowledged that the post-COVID-19 world appears to be one not only more distrustful of globalisation per se — as leaders face pressure to prioritise their own public health and economic exigencies over longer-term multilateral commitments promising fewer immediate political rewards — but one under increasing pressure from an intensifying US-China competition at risk of serious escalation, as we have already seen with the recent US-China trade war. Against this backdrop, the coronavirus crisis has underscored the urgency of a vital question: how to shape relations with an authoritarian China in order to best confront the challenges of the 21st century? The EU has a major independent role to play based on its values, interests and in coordination with its allies and partners.

The EPP's Commitments

Our core values

We will always be respectful of the rich tradition of Chinese culture and the historic achievements of the Chinese people. We firmly believe there is no incompatibility between Chinese culture and democracy: Hong Kong and Taiwan have for decades provided living proof of this. We are well aware of the difference between the CCP, on the one hand, and the Chinese nation, Chinese culture and Chinese citizens, on the other: to criticise the former is not to criticise the latter. We acknowledge our need in Europe for a better understanding of China and of Chinese through independent language and culture programmes addressing



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all aspects of Chinese developments, while critically evaluating the role of cultural institutes run by Hanban (Confucius Institutes) in European universities.

Commitment to fundamental, universal values will always guide EPP policy. Guided by these values, we remain committed to dialogue and to working with China as an essential global partner on the basis of reciprocity and mutual respect, but also to countering its influence where it weakens democracy, freedom and the rule of law.

The EPP reiterates — as we did in our October 2019 '**Resolution in response to the ongoing protests in Hong Kong**' and in our June 2020 '**EPP Presidency Statement on Chinese Disinformation and the Situation in Hong Kong**' — our core belief, as expressed in our **2012 platform**, that 'Freedom is inherent in the nature of man' and our commitment, as expressed in our **2019 campaign manifesto**, to the principles of democracy, human rights, human dignity, freedom and responsibility, equality between men and women, solidarity, rule of law, justice, pluralism and tolerance. We share the EU's **stated concerns** that freedom of expression, assembly and the press do not fully exist in China. Especially concerning are systematic human rights violations, including against freedom of religion and in the discrimination of minorities, in Xinjiang and Tibet; renewed persecution of Christians; arbitrary and illegal detentions, notably the case of the Swedish citizen Gui Minhai; forced organ- harvesting from prisoners; and ongoing crackdowns in Hong Kong, where the Chinese government's increasing attempts to undermine free expression and democratic representation, most recently by unilateral introduction of a national security law, violate the agreed 'One Country, Two Systems' principle and call into question whether Hong Kong should any longer be considered an autonomous region.

The EPP calls on the EU to further respond to China's many human rights violations. We call for the release of arbitrarily detained and imprisoned human rights defenders, dissidents and others, including the Swedish citizen Gui Minhai.

We note with great concern the recent new reports of systematic human rights violations — including forced labour, internment, sterilisations and abortions — taking place in Xinjiang against Uyghurs and other mostly- Muslim minorities; and we demand an independent and urgent investigation into these allegations.

We stress the need for free access to Tibet, including for diplomats, journalists, tourists and Tibetans themselves.

We must ensure that all aspects of EU relations with China be guided by the values stipulated in the Treaties. We must ensure that the European Union speak out loud and clear in calling out human rights abuses in mainland China and in Hong Kong. To that end, the EPP supports swift finalisation of the EU's Global Sanctions Regime enabling the imposition of targeted sanctions on any Chinese officials responsible for human rights abuses.

Finally, we stress our expectation that the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue take place in China later this year, once COVID-19 restrictions are eased.

EU foreign and defence policy vis-à-vis China

Geopolitically, China under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party has become not only a systemic rival to the EU but a challenge to liberal democracy more broadly.



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China has employed various tactics to undermine European unity: intensifying contacts with the Western Balkans region, for instance, by increasing its investment in infrastructure and other key economic sectors. The EU remains the biggest trading partner for the Western Balkans, but closer ties with China have made the region more vulnerable to Chinese influence and to drift from EU values.

Careful analysis shows increasing military, technological and energy coordination on the part of China and Russia, aimed at least in part at bolstering an authoritarian model of governance and at weakening in turn both the alternative, democratic governance model and the rule of law as well as the organisations and alliances of the West. One theatre where this coordination could play a critical role is in the Arctic, where China has a growing presence.

We also see the Chinese government engaged in supporting authoritarianism in Latin America — for instance, by providing support for the corrupt regime led by Socialist dictator Nicolás Maduro, who has plunged Venezuela into both economic and humanitarian crisis — and in Africa, where China's strategy has included not only deepening its investment in critical infrastructure but amassing leverage via credit and intelligence gathering. Partnership — based in common interests and values and goals — with Africa, the EU's **natural partner and neighbour**, is and must remain a clear priority of the European Union.

In Asia, whose development many predict will characterise the 21st century, China's growing influence is already having major implications for the EU. China has engaged in military expansionism in the South China Sea, openly disregarding the 2016 **ruling** of the Permanent Court of Arbitration and asserting control, by building illegal military bases on artificial islands, over an area to which it has no legal claim. As shipping lanes in these waters are of critical importance for the European as well as the global economy, China's actions here threaten EU interests. We therefore fully support efforts to strengthen EU cooperation with value partners in the Asia-Pacific, in particular Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and Taiwan.

The EPP strongly supports enabling Taiwan to practically and meaningfully participate in international fora, such as the WHO — as it did, with China's consent, as an official observer from 2009 to 2016. We condemn official Chinese threats made against European leaders expressing support for freedom and democracy in Taiwan, as happened in the case of Czech Senate Speaker Miloš Vystrčil at the end of August 2020. We also condemn China's increasing threats of potential military intervention on the island.

EU cooperation with partners in the Asia-Pacific should include joint projects in defence and security, regular joint naval operations, projects to strengthen cyber resilience and efforts to further deepen economic ties: the recent **EU-Japan EPA** is a good example of this. The EU should also explore the possibilities of greater cooperation with the Blue Dot Network.

The EPP similarly supports EU efforts to work with potential strategic partners in South, Southeast and Central Asia: for example, via joint projects to strengthen the resilience of democracy, freedom of expression, rule of law and economic incentives such as the EU's generalised system of preferences (GPA plus), or via possible FTAs or cooperation in defence and security policy.

To achieve its foreign policy aims, China has used a growing 'sharp' power to pressure not only countries but also organisations, companies and even individuals who contest the CCP line. This has raised the spectre of a new threat of '**digital authoritarianism**', given China's growing predominance in technical fields such as Artificial Intelligence (AI) and the increasing indispensability of the worldwide web. Chinese companies are becoming global leaders in exporting sophisticated surveillance technology and by deepening



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ties with local law enforcement in countries with deplorable human rights records. Growing economic leverage in Asia and Africa has allowed China to better export its own technology regimes and standards and build strong coalitions internationally. Specific Internet of Things (IoT) devices, software and even mobile apps from China are prone to technical vulnerabilities and potential misuse of personal data. The EU must be firm in protecting fundamental rights such as individual data privacy and in setting the standards for cutting-edge technologies like AI. Just as we can never accept Chinese censorship or surveillance in Europe, we should also not accept that such practices extend outward from China to encroach on other parts of the world.

Europe's strength is in forming reliable networks and sustainable, multilateral partnerships. The EU must continue to build such networks, particularly in Asia: standing firm with partners who share common values and jointly champion the rules-based liberal order, the EU will thus be positioned to negotiate with China as well as to counter its influence where this undermines core universal values or EU interests. We welcome the EEAS's intention to update, together with EU Member States, the 2019 **Strategic Outlook** document to include new areas of action: e.g. innovation, international organisations, consolidation of the EU's strategic autonomy and combatting disinformation. Just as Member States formed a consensus in 2014 following Russia's annexation of Crimea, EU unity vis-à-vis China will also be vital. As in the past, the EPP must take a leading role.

Regarding Europe's traditional defence: China's use of sharp power in the Indo-Pacific theatre is significantly of great strategic concern to Europe's most important security partner, the United States, which has security commitments not only with NATO allies but also with Japan, South Korea, Australia and others. As the EPP has consistently stated, while the EU and its Member States can and must do more to strengthen their own defence capacities, these efforts should complement — never undermine — the essential role of NATO in our security architecture; true burden sharing for the EU means having the capacity to act independently when fundamental US interests are not at stake. An equal transatlantic partnership must therefore remain paramount for the European Union: this partnership is based in shared historic values and is the cornerstone of Europe's security and defence. There is no equidistance between China and the US. The EU should pursue strategies for regions, and in areas, of common EU-US interest. The EU and the US must work together to address the common challenge posed by the CCP. The May 2020 **US Strategic Approach** to China provides a relevant and important list of common transatlantic interests and areas of cooperation with regard to our relations with China.

Firm commitment to the transatlantic partnership does not exclude cooperating with the Chinese government where such cooperation is beneficial. The European Union has shown solidarity, vision and leadership on critical issues such as data privacy, green energy and development aid. On many of these issues, the EU has worked, and will continue to work, constructively with the Chinese government. The agreed framework of the **UN's Sustainability Development Goals** and the **Paris Agreement** are notable examples. Fighting climate change and the European Commission's Green Deal are top EU priorities and should remain so when cooperating with the Chinese government, especially since China, like Europe, aims to become the world leader in green energy and sustainability.

Other notable examples of cooperation are the **Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action**, the **Connectivity Platform** and the still-to-be concluded **Comprehensive Agreement on Investment** (CAI). Another is the bilateral **agreement on Geographical Indications** (GIs) concluded in November 2019, which will protect 100 European GIs in China and 100 Chinese GIs in the EU. Still another is the 30 April 2020 agreement reached by the EU, China, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Mexico, Brazil and several others to form an **interim dis-**



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pute mechanism within the framework of the WTO and in light of the inoperability, since December 2019, of the WTO's Appellate Body.

Forging a strong position in defending and promoting EU interests also means, however, that unfairness in any relationship or institution must be addressed. China under the CCP has taken advantage of the openness of free and democratic societies while increasingly restricting foreign access in turn. This has served to support the CCP's survival, domestically, and to strengthen China's hand in claiming its system of governance as most effective and best suited for the 21st century. This has had not only a political but also an economic dimension.

Trade and investment

The EU must establish and enforce a level playing field with China. This means reciprocity and clear rules to prevent market distortions: by maintaining product standards and safety, by protecting against the distortive effects of state-owned enterprises and heavily subsidised strategic industries and by enforcing intellectual property rights, including against forced technology transfers. It means fair competition in third markets — for example, and significantly, in the context of China's Belt and Road Initiative and the Made in China 2025 manufacturing strategy. And it means stronger EU competitiveness, including by making certain critical supply chains less dependent on China, even as the EU must continue to pursue an agenda of free and rules-based trade within a cooperative multilateral framework.

The EU is China's biggest **trade** partner, China the EU's second-biggest (after the US). Yet China is the EU's most restrictive trade partner and continues to engage in dumping and unfair subsidies: in its latest **report**, the European Commission notes that 2/3 of its 2019 trade defence measures focused on imports from China. Such trade defence measures should be strengthened even further, particularly in support of Small- and Medium- Sized Enterprises, in line with a broader strategy to strengthen the competitiveness of European businesses.

Regarding foreign direct investment (FDI), China restricts its market far more than the EU does for China, and there remains much to be desired as to China's commitment to transparency and to environmental, labour and competition standards, as reported by the EU partner present on the ground, the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China. The CAI aims to correct these imbalances. The agreement should contain enforcement mechanisms, should enable improved market access for EU investments in China, should protect and incentivise sustainability — and should ultimately be concluded as soon as possible.

We must ensure consistency and adherence to our values in the context of trade and investment. The European Parliament in its June 2020 **resolution** on Hong Kong stated that it will take the human rights situation in China, including in Hong Kong, into consideration when asked to endorse either the CAI or any future EU trade deal with China. We as the EPP insist that a human rights clause be part of any such agreements.

As the current economic downturn increases even further the risks of harmful foreign investment, critical European infrastructure — such as ports and airports but also including roads, railways or recharging infrastructure — have become attractive targets of foreign investment. Unfair practices and subsidies disadvantaging our domestic companies and our strategic autonomy should therefore be prevented. The Commission's 2019 **FDI screening regulation** — supplemented with additional **guidance** in March 2020, in the context of the pandemic and in preparation for full implementation in October 2020 — can play a crucial



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role by helping to protect EU interests from potentially insidious investment. We join the Commission in urging Member States who have not yet established their own, complementary national screening mechanisms to do so; continuous exchange of information and best practices among European stakeholders will be essential.

Of course, China is not the only source of potentially problematic FDI for the EU; but it is a major source. Among the most sensitive vulnerabilities in this regard is the EU's critical infrastructure. The European Union's historic openness to FDI cannot come at the cost of vigilance in ensuring long-term resilience and strategic autonomy. These concerns were reiterated in NATO's 2019 **London Declaration** emphasising the security of communications, including via 5G. We therefore welcome as an important step the **measures** outlined by the Commission in January 2020 for mitigating security risks associated with 5G. The EU's long-term security, including by guarding against malign intelligence operations, cannot be taken for granted and must be our top priority.

Another critical area — and yet one not covered by existing EU FDI screening regulations or export controls — is the field of Research and Development (R&D). The EU needs a more clear-eyed view of research collaboration with China. As financial acquisitions and other equity investments have become more scrutinised, Chinese companies have stepped up efforts at R&D collaboration with EU companies, universities and governments, among other entities. Resilience is needed against attempts by the CCP to capture Western universities and other knowledge centres. Future regulations must address these vulnerabilities in protecting sensitive EU technologies and know-how.

Conclusion

For the EU to defend and promote the interest of European citizens in this increasingly interconnected world, now riven by new tensions, we must work together in solidarity in pursuit of shared goals. Unity will be essential to any alternative, strategic vision for global engagement we put forward: whether on common defence, climate change, public health, research and innovation, trade, regulatory standards or other issues. China is simultaneously partner, competitor and rival to the European Union. Guided by our values — foremost our commitment to preserving the freedoms inherent in liberal democracy — we must act with strategic vision, boldness, unity and cohesion in addressing the challenge posed by China and to ensure effective and strategic multilateral cooperation. It is, therefore, the right time to redefine our relations and approach towards China, engaging positively with the Chinese people while ensuring a values-based and consistent approach towards the Chinese Communist Party.

The EPP endorses shaping EU-China relations by maintaining and strengthening partnership on key geopolitical issues in our mutual interest. Cooperation is especially needed for global climate efforts to succeed and to ensure a green recovery. We insist on a level playing field with China to ensure fairness and competitiveness. As the family of Christian Democratic, conservative and like-minded parties, we are particularly concerned by China's mono-party system. We deplore the lack of full civic freedoms and party-political pluralism that prevents China from unleashing its full potential and becoming a prospering democracy and a driving force for peace and cooperation in the service of citizens and in line with their universal human rights.

We must be prepared for China's economic rise and global leadership, and for the key question: will China's



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‘one country, two systems’ paradigm ultimately become ‘one country, one authoritarian’ — or ‘one country, one democratic’ — system? The CCP is currently set on the former; and yet the responsibility of global leadership ultimately requires respect for democratic freedoms, human rights and the rule of law. This is why the EU must work together with partners and allies: to take a stand for the bedrock values and norms which must — for our sake as well as China’s — shape our 21st-century world.



**If you have any question
you would like to ask please
contact us.**

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Program

EPP Political Assembly Panel Discussion

Tuesday, 4 February 2020, 9:30-11:00h

European Parliament, Brussels, Belgium, Room A3E2, ASP Agora Simone Veil

“The Prevailing Circumstances in the Middle East: Implications for EU Policy in the Region”

- Kay Bailey HUTCHISON, Permanent Representative of the United States to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- Nickolay MLADENOV, UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process
- Sami NADER, Director of the Levant Institute for Strategic Affairs (LISA)
- Bishop Paolo BIZZETI, Apostolic Vicar of Anatolia

Moderation: Patrick VOLLER, EPP Secretary of External Relations



The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison
Permanent Representative of the United States to
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
US Mission to NATO
Boulevard Leopold III
1110 Brussels

Brussels, 22 January 2020

Dear Ambassador Hutchison,

Given your special role as ambassador to NATO on behalf of the United States of America, the European Union's closest partner, we at the European People's Party (EPP) are honoured to invite you to participate in a high-level panel debate entitled **"The Prevailing Circumstances in the Middle East: Implications for EU Policy in the Region"**. This debate will take place at the next EPP Political Assembly meeting, to be held on Tuesday, 4 February 2020, from 9:30 to 11:00 in the European Parliament in Brussels (Room A3E2, ASP Agora Simone Veil).

The EPP is the EU's centre-right party and its largest and most influential political family. The EPP currently includes 84 parties and partners from 43 countries; 10 EU and 3 non-EU heads of state and government; and 10 members of the European Commission, including the President of the European Commission. The EPP has remained the largest Group in the European Parliament since the 1999 European elections.

The EPP Political Assembly is a regular, internal decision-making body of the party and is composed of delegates from EPP member parties, associations and groups, as well as from the EPP Presidency and elected Members of the European Parliament.

Recent weeks have shown how fragile the Middle East and wider region are and how much is at stake for the European Union. As the EPP, we understand the need to become more engaged, and we would like to hear your expertise. The recent crisis in Iran, the peace efforts regarding Libya and the role of Turkey and other third parties in the region will all be topics of discussion. Please find attached a draft program of the panel debate.

We would very much appreciate your confirming your participation as soon as possible by replying to this email. Should you need any further information, please do not hesitate to contact EPP Secretary of External Relations Patrick Voller (Email: pv@epp.eu; Tel.: +32 471 907697).

We look forward to seeing you soon in Brussels.

Best regards,

Donald TUSK
EPP President

Antonio LÓPEZ-ISTÚRIZ WHITE
EPP Secretary General

We would be delighted to welcome you for a small dinner discussion featuring

Nelson W. Cunningham,

President of McLarty Associates, former Special Advisor to President Bill Clinton on Western Hemisphere Affairs & close aide to Senator Joe Biden

to discuss *the US Presidential elections and their impact on EU-US relations*

on *Wednesday, 19th February 2020 at 8pm.*

Salon Bleu, Restaurant Brugmann, Avenue Brugmann 52/54, 1190 Forest

We look very much forward to seeing you.





Antonio López-Istúriz White ✓ @TonoEPP · 4 Jun

Great discussion with [@RepGallagher](#) at [@MartensCentre](#) and [@congingst](#) webinar. We addressed current and future challenges between EU-US, potential areas for cooperation and the need to restore the West's autonomy on various sectors' supply chains.



Antonio López-Istúriz White ✓ @TonoEPP · 4 Jun

.[@RepGallagher](#), an honour to share a transatlantic debate with you. Thank you for your distinguished military service in the marine corps which I'm sure also contributed to the better security of us Europeans.

